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Abstract—We investigate the secure connectivity of wireless
sensor networks under a heterogeneous random key predistribu-
tion scheme and a heterogeneous channel model. In particular,
we study a random graph formed by the intersection of an
inhomogeneous random key graph with an inhomogeneous
Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graph. The former graph is naturally induced by
the heterogeneous random key predistribution scheme while the
latter graph constitutes a heterogeneous on/off channel model;
wherein, the wireless channel between a class-i node and a class-
j node is on with probability αij independently. We present
conditions (in the form of zero-one laws) on how to scale the
parameters of the intersection model so that it has no isolated
node with high probability as the number of nodes gets large.
We also present numerical results to support these zero-one
laws in the finite-node regime.
Index Terms—General Random Intersection Graphs, Wire-
less Sensor Networks, Security, Inhomogeneous Random Key
Graphs, Inhomogeneous ER Graphs, Connectivity, Reliability.
1. INTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) consist of low-cost, low-
power, small sensor nodes that are typically deployed ran-
domly in large numbers enabling numerous applications such
as military applications, health monitoring, environmental
monitoring, etc [1]. WSNs are typically deployed in hostile
environments (e.g., battlefields), making it crucial to use
cryptographic protection to secure sensor communications. In
[2, Chapter 13 and references therein] and [3], authors review
several key distribution schemes for WSNs and investigate
their applicability given the classical constraints of a sensor
node, namely: limited computational capabilities, limited
transmission power, lack of a priori knowledge of deployment
configuration, and vulnerability to node capture attacks. We
refer the reader to [4], [5] for a detailed analysis of security
challenges in WSNs.
In [6], Yag˘an introduced a new variation of the Eschenauer
and Gligor (EG) key predistribution scheme [7], referred to
as the heterogeneous key predistribution scheme. The hetero-
geneous key predistribution scheme accounts for the cases
when the network comprises sensor nodes with varying level
of resources and/or connectivity requirements, e.g., regular
nodes vs. cluster heads, which is likely to be the case for
many WSN applications [8]. According to this scheme, each
sensor node belongs to a specific priority class and is given a
number of keys corresponding to its class. More specifically,
Given r classes, a sensor node is classified as a class-i node
with probability µi, resulting in a probability distribution
µ = {µ1, µ2, . . . , µr} with µi > 0, for i = 1, . . . , r and∑r
i=1 µi = 1. Sensors belonging to class-i are each given
Ki keys selected uniformly at random (without replacement)
from a key pool of size P . As with the EG scheme, pairs of
sensors that share key(s) can communicate securely over an
available channel after deployment.
Let K(n,µ,K, P ) denote the random graph induced by the
heterogeneous key predistribution scheme described above,
where K = {K1,K2, . . . ,Kr} and n denotes the number
of nodes. A pair of nodes are adjacent as long as they
share a key. This model is referred to as the inhomogeneous
random key graph in [6]; wherein, zero-one laws for the
properties that K(n,µ,K, P ) i) has no isolated nodes and
ii) is connected are established under the assumption of full
visibility. Namely, it was assumed that all wireless channels
are reliable and secure communications among participating
nodes require only the existence of a shared key.
Our paper is motivated by the fact that the full visibility
assumption is too optimistic and is not likely to hold in most
WSN applications; e.g., the wireless medium of communica-
tion is often unreliable and sensors typically have limited
communication ranges. To that end, we study the secure
connectivity of heterogeneous WSNs under a heterogeneous
on/off communication model; wherein, the communication
channel between two nodes of class-i and class-j is on with
probability αij . The heterogeneous on/off communication
model induces the inhomogeneous Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) graph
[9], [10], denoted hereafter by G(n,µ,α). The overall WSN
can then be modeled by a random graph model formed by the
intersection of an inhomogeneous random key graph and an
inhomogeneous ER graph. We denote the intersection graph
K(n;µ,K, P ) ∩G(n;µ,α) by H(n;µ,K, P,α).
Our main contribution is as follows. We present conditions
(in the form of zero-one laws) on how to scale the parameters
of the intersection model H(n;µ,K, P,α) so that it has no
secure node which is isolated with high probability when
the number of nodes n gets large. Our result generalizes
several results in the literature, including the zero-one laws
for absence of isolated nodes in inhomogeneous random key
graphs intersecting homogeneous ER graphs [11], and in
homogeneous random key graphs intersecting homogeneous
ER graphs [12].
We close with a word on notation and conventions in use.
All limiting statements, including asymptotic equivalence are
considered with the number of sensor nodes n going to
infinity. The random variables (rvs) under consideration are
all defined on the same probability triple (Ω,F ,P). Proba-
bilistic statements are made with respect to this probability
measure P, and we denote the corresponding expectation by
E. The indicator function of an event E is denoted by 1[E].
We say that an event holds with high probability (whp) if
it holds with probability 1 as n → ∞. For any discrete
set S, we write |S| for its cardinality. In comparing the
asymptotic behaviors of the sequences {an}, {bn}, we use
an = o(bn), an = ω(bn), an = O(bn), an = Ω(bn), and
an = Θ(bn), with their meaning in the standard Landau
notation. We also use an ∼ bn to denote the asymptotic
equivalence limn→∞ an/bn = 1.
2. THE MODEL
We consider a network consisting of n sensors labeled
as v1, v2, . . . , vn. Each sensor node is classified into one
of the r classes, e.g., priority levels, according to a prob-
ability distribution µ = {µ1, µ2, . . . , µr} with µi > 0 for
i = 1, . . . , r and
∑r
i=1 µi = 1. Then, a class-i node is
assigned Ki cryptographic keys selected uniformly at random
and without replacement from a key pool of size P . It follows
that the key ring Σx of node x is an PKtx -valued random
variable (rv) where PKtx denotes the collection of all subsets
of {1, . . . , P} with exactly Ktx elements and tx denotes the
class of node vx. The rvs Σ1,Σ2, . . . ,Σn are then i.i.d. with
P[Σx = S | tx = i] =
(
P
Ki
)−1
, S ∈ PKi .
Let K = {K1,K2, . . . ,Kr} and assume without loss of
generality that K1 ≤ K2 ≤ . . . ≤ Kr. Consider a random
graphK induced on the vertex set V = {v1, . . . , vn} such that
a pair of distinct nodes vx and vy are adjacent in K, denoted
by vx ∼K vy , if they have at least one cryptographic key in
common, i.e.,
vx ∼K vy if Σx ∩Σy 6= ∅. (1)
The adjacency condition (1) defines the inhomogeneous
random key graph denoted by K(n;µ,K, P ) [6]. This model
is also known in the literature as the general random inter-
section graph; e.g., see [13]–[15]. The probability pij that a
class-i node and a class-j node are adjacent is given by
pij = 1−
(
P−Ki
Kj
)
(
P
Kj
) (2)
as long as Ki + Kj ≤ P ; otherwise if Ki + Kj > P , we
have pij = 1. Let λi denote the mean probability that a
class-i node is connected to another node in K(n;µ,K, P ).
We have
λi =
r∑
j=1
µjpij . (3)
We aim to investigate the performance of the heteroge-
neous key predistribution scheme without the full visibility
assumption [6]. More precisely, to account for the possibility
that communication channels between two nodes may not
be available, e.g., due to deep fading, interference, etc.,
we assume a heterogeneous on/off channel model; wherein,
the communication channel between two nodes of type-i
and type-j is on with probability αij . Consider a random
graph G induced on the vertex set V = {v1, . . . , vn}
such that each node is classified into one of the r classes,
e.g., priority levels, according to a probability distribution
µ = {µ1, µ2, . . . , µr} with µi > 0 for i = 1, . . . , r and∑r
i=1 µi = 1. Then, a distinct class-i node vx and a distinct
class-j node vy are adjacent in G, denoted by vx ∼G vy , if
Bxy(αij) = 1 where Bxy(αij) denotes a Bernoulli rv with
success probability αij . This adjacency conditions induces
the inhomogeneous ER graph G(n;µ,α) on the vertex set
V , which has received some interest recently [9], [10], and
would account for the fact that different nodes could have
different radio capabilities, or could be deployed in locations
with different channel characteristics. Although the on/off
channel model may be considered too simple, it allows a
comprehensive analysis of the properties of interest and is
often a good approximation of more realistic channel models,
e.g., the disk model [16]. In fact, the simulations results in
[12] suggest that the connectivity behavior of the EG scheme
under the on/off channel model is asymptotically equivalent
to that under the disk model.
Our system model is obtained by the intersection of the
inhomogeneous random key graph K(n;µ,K, P ) with the
inhomogeneous ER graph G(n;µ,α). We denote the inter-
section graph by H(n;µ,K, P,α), i.e., H(n;µ,K, P,α) :=
K(n;µ,K, P ) ∩ G(n;µ,α). A distinct class-i node vx is
adjacent to a distinct class-j node vy in H if and only if
they are adjacent in both K and G. In words, the edges in
H(n;µ,K, P,α) represent pairs of sensors that share crypto-
graphic key(s) and have a communication channel in between
that is on, and hence can communicate securely. There-
fore, studying the connectivity properties of H(n;µ,K, P,α)
amounts to studying the secure connectivity of heterogeneous
WSNs under the heterogeneous on/off channel model.
To simplify the notation, we let θ = (K,P ), and Θ =
(θ,α). By independence, we see that the probability of edge
assignment between a class-i node vx and a class-j node vy
in H(n;µ,Θ) is given by
P[vx ∼ vy | tx = i, ty = j] = αijpij
Similar to (3), we denote the mean edge probability for a
class-i node in H(n;µ,Θ) as Λi. It is clear that
Λi =
r∑
j=1
µjαijpij , i = 1, . . . , r. (4)
We denote the minimum mean edge probability in H(n;µ,Θ)
as Λm, i.e.,
m := argmin
i
Λi.
We also let
d := argmax
j
αmj , (5)
s := argmax
j
αmjpmj . (6)
Throughout, we assume that the number of classes r is
fixed and does not scale with n, and so are the probabilities
µ1, . . . , µr. All of the remaining parameters are assumed to
be scaled with n.
3. MAIN RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We refer to a mapping K1, . . . ,Kr, P : N0 → Nr+10 as a
scaling (for the inhomogeneous random key graph) if
1 ≤ K1,n ≤ K2,n ≤ . . . ≤ Kr,n ≤ Pn/2 (7)
hold for all n = 2, 3, . . .. Similarly any mapping α = {αij} :
N0 → (0, 1)r×r defines a scaling for the inhomogeneous ER
graphs. A mapping Θ : N0 → Nr+10 × (0, 1)r×r defines
a scaling for the intersection graph H(n;µ,Θ) given that
condition (7) holds. We remark that under (7), the edge
probabilities pij will be given by (2).
A. Results
We present a zero-one law for the absence of isolated
nodes in H(n;µ,Θn).
Theorem 3.1. Consider a probability distribution µ =
{µ1, µ2, . . . , µr} with µi > 0 for i = 1, . . . , r, a scaling
K1, . . . ,Kr, P : N0 → N
r+1
0 , and a scaling α = {αij} :
N0 → (0, 1)
r×r such that
Λm(n) ∼ c
logn
n
(8)
holds for some c > 0.
i) If
lim
n→∞
αmd(n) logn = 0,
or
lim
n→∞
αmd(n) log n = α
∗ ∈ (0,∞],
lim
n→∞
αmm(n) logn = α
∗∗ ∈ (0,∞].
Then, we have
lim
n→∞
P
[
H(n;µ,Θn) has
no isolated nodes
]
= 0 if c < 1
ii) We have
lim
n→∞
P
[
H(n;µ,Θn) has
no isolated nodes
]
= 1 if c > 1
The scaling condition (8) will often be used in the form
Λm(n) = cn
logn
n
, n = 2, 3, . . . (9)
with limn→∞ cn = c > 0.
Theorem 3.1 states that H(n;µ,Θn) has no isolated node
whp if the minimum mean degree, i.e., nΛm, is scaled as
(1 + ǫ) logn for some ǫ > 0. On the other hand, if this
minimum mean degree scales as (1−ǫ) logn for some ǫ > 0,
then whp H(n;µ,Θn) has a class-m node that is isolated,
and hence not connected. We remark that α∗∗ ≤ α∗ since
αmm(n) ≤ αmd(n) for n = 1, 2, . . ..
The zero-one law established here for the absence of
isolated nodes in H(n;µ,Θn) shall be regarded as a crucial
first step towards establishing the connectivity result. In fact,
Theorem 3.1 already implies the zero-law for connectivity,
i.e., that
lim
n→∞
P
[
H(n;µ,Θn)
is connected
]
= 0 if c < 1.
This is because a graph can not be connected if it contains an
isolated node. Also, for several classes of random graphs it is
known that the conditions that ensure connectivity coincide
with those ensuring absence of isolated nodes; e.g., random
key graphs [17], (homogeneous) ER graphs [18], and random
geometric key graphs [19]. This prompts us to introduce the
following conjecture.
Conjecture 3.2. Consider a probability distribution µ =
(µ1, µ2, . . . , µr) with µi > 0 for i = 1, . . . , r, a scaling
K1, . . . ,Kr, P : N0 → N
r+1
0 , and a scaling α = (αij) :
N0 → (0, 1)r×r such that (8) holds. With either
i)
lim
n→∞
αmd(n) logn = 0,
or
ii)
lim
n→∞
αmd(n) log n = α
∗ ∈ (0,∞],
lim
n→∞
αmm(n) logn = α
∗∗ ∈ (0,∞],
and possibly under some additional conditions, we have
lim
n→∞
P
[
H(n;µ,Θn)
is connected
]
=
{
0 if c < 1
1 if c > 1
B. Comparison with related work
Our main result extends the results established by Eletreby
and Yag˘an in [11] for the inhomogeneous random key graph
intersecting the (homogeneous) ER graph. There, zero-one
laws for the property that the graph has no isolated nodes and
the property that the graph is connected were established. It
is clear that our work generalizes the model given in [11]
by considering the inhomogeneous ER graph, enabling the
analysis of networks with heterogeneous radio capabilities.
Indeed, when αij(n) = α(n) for i, j = 1, . . . , r and each
n = 1, 2, . . ., our result recovers the absence of isolated nodes
result given in [11].
In [6], zero-one laws for the property that the graph has no
isolated nodes and the property that the graph is connected
were established for the inhomogeneous random key graph
K(n,µ,K, P ) under the full visibility assumption. It is clear
that, although a crucial first step in the study of heterogeneous
key predistribution schemes, the full visibility assumption is
not likely to hold in most practical settings. In fact, by setting
αij(n) = 1 for i, j = 1, . . . , r and each n = 1, 2, . . . (i.e.,
by assuming that all wireless channels are on), our absence
of isolated nodes result reduces to that given in [6].
Finally, Yag˘an in [12] considered the homogeneous ran-
dom key graph (where all nodes receive Kn keys), intersect-
ing the homogeneous ER graph [20]. Our work generalizes
[12] by considering the intersection of the inhomogeneous ER
graph with a more general random graph model that accounts
for the cases where nodes can be assigned different number
of keys; i.e., with the inhomogeneous random key graph. In
fact, with r = 1, i.e., when α is a scalar and all nodes belong
to the same class and thus receive the same number of keys,
our absence of isolated node result recovers the result given
in [12].
C. Significance of the results
1) Network Reliability Problem: The problem studied
in this paper is closely connected to the popular network
reliability problem [18, Section 7.5], described as follows:
Starting with a fixed, deterministic graph H, obtain I(H; p)
by deleting each edge of H independently with probability
1 − p. Network reliability problem is often translated to
finding the probability that I(H; p) is connected as a func-
tion of p. For arbitrary graphs, H, this problem is shown
[21], [22] to be #P -complete, meaning that no polynomial
algorithm exists for its solution, unless P = NP . Our
result given above constitutes a crucial first step towards the
asymptotic solution of the network reliability problem for
inhomogeneous random key graphs when edges are deleted
with different probabilities. Put differently, we consider a
generic network reliability problem; wherein, different links
fail with different probabilities which paves the way for
many interesting problems. Although asymptotic in nature,
our result can still provide useful insights about the reliability
properties of random key graphs with number of vertices n
being on the order of thousands.
2) Common-Interest Friendship Networks: We demon-
strate an application of our result in the context of a common-
interest friendship network, denoted by Gc. A common
interest relationship between two friends manifests from their
selection of common objects from a pool of available objects.
Clearly, this is modeled by the inhomogeneous random key
graph; wherein, the inhomogeneity captures the fact that
different people have different number of interests. The
friendship network is modeled by an inhomogeneous ER
graph, meaning that any two individuals are connected with
a probability that is based on their corresponding classes
independently from other individuals. The class of an in-
dividual could represent her job title, current city, academic
degree, etc. As a result, Gc becomes the intersection of the
inhomogeneous random key graph with the inhomogeneous
ER graph. Our results on its absence of isolated nodes con-
stitutes the first step in revealing the conditions under which
global information diffusion can take place in the common-
interest network. In particular, when Gc is connected, global
information diffusion is possible.
4. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We now present numerical results and simulations to check
the validity of Theorem 3.1 in the finite node regime. In all
experiments, we fix the number of nodes at n = 500 and the
size of the key pool at P = 104. For better visualization, we
use the curve fitting tool of MATLAB.
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Fig. 1. Empirical probability that H(n;µ,Θ) is connected as a function
of K for α12 = 0.2, α12 = 0.4, and α12 = 0.6 with n = 500 and
P = 104 ; in each case, α11 = α22 = 0.3. The empirical probability value
is obtained by averaging over 400 experiments. Vertical dashed lines stand
for the critical threshold of connectivity asserted by Conjecture 3.2.
In Figure 1, we set the channel matrix to
α =
[
0.3 α12
α12 0.3
]
and consider the channel parameters α12 = 0.2, α12 = 0.4,
and α12 = 0.6, while varying the parameter K1 (i.e., the
smallest key ring size) from 10 to 35. The number of classes
is fixed to 2, with µ = {0.5, 0.5}. For each value of K1,
we set K2 = K1 + 5. For each parameter pair (K,α), we
generate 400 independent samples of the graph H(n;µ,Θ)
and count the number of times (out of a possible 400)
that the obtained graphs i) have no isolated nodes and ii)
are connected. Dividing the counts by 400, we obtain the
(empirical) probabilities for the events of interest. In all cases
considered here, we observe that H(n;µ,Θ) is connected
whenever it has no isolated nodes yielding the same empirical
probability for both events. This confirms the asymptotic
equivalence of the connectivity and absence of isolated nodes
properties in H(n;µ,Θn) as we give by Conjecture 3.2.
For each value of α12, we show the critical threshold
of connectivity “predicted” by Conjecture 3.2 by a vertical
dashed line. More specifically, the vertical dashed lines stand
for the minimum integer value of K1 that satisfies
Λm(n) =
2∑
j=1
µjαmj
(
1−
(
P−Kj
Km
)
(
P
Km
)
)
>
logn
n
. (10)
We see from Figure 1 that the probability of connectivity
transitions from zero to one within relatively small variations
of K1. Moreover, the critical values of K1 obtained by (10)
lie within this transition interval. We finally note that for each
parameter pair (K,α) in Fig 1, we have Λm = Λ1.
Next, we set the channel matrix to
α =
[
α11 0.2
0.2 0.2
]
in Figure 2, and consider the channel parameters α11 = 0.2,
α11 = 0.4, and α11 = 0.6, while varying the parameter K1
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Fig. 2. Empirical probability that H(n;µ,Θ) is connected as a function
of K for α11 = 0.2, α11 = 0.4, and α11 = 0.6 with n = 500 and
P = 104; in each case, α12 = α22 = 0.2. The empirical probability value
is obtained by averaging over 400 experiments. Vertical dashed lines stand
for the critical threshold of connectivity asserted by Conjecture 3.2.
(i.e., the smallest key ring size) from 10 to 35. The number
of classes is fixed to 2, with µ = {0.5, 0.5}. For each value
of K1, we set K2 = K1 + 5. Using the same procedure
that produced Figure 1, we obtain the empirical probability
that H(n;µ,Θ) is connected versus K1. As before, the
critical threshold of connectivity asserted by Conjecture 3.2
is shown by a vertical dashed line in each curve. One
interesting observation of Figure 2 is how the behavior of
the probability of connectivity changes with α11. In fact,
when α11 = 0.2, we have Λm = Λ1, while for α11 ≥ 0.4,
we have Λm = Λ2. Consequently, the value of α11 (which
only appears in the calculations of Λ1) becomes irrelevant to
the scaling condition given by (10). We notice from Fig 2,
that for α11 ≥ 0.4, fixed α12, and fixed α22, we have the
same critical value of K1 and quite similar behavior of the
probability of connectivity.
Finally, we set the channel matrix to
α =
[
α 0.2
0.2 α
]
and consider four different minimum key ring sizes, K1 =
20, K1 = 25, K1 = 30, and K1 = 50 while varying the
parameter α from 0 to 1. The number of classes is fixed to 2
with µ = {0.5, 0.5} and we set K2 = K1+5 for each value
of K1. Using the same procedure that produced Figure 1, we
obtain the empirical probability that H(n;µ,Θ) is connected
versus α. As before, the critical threshold of connectivity
asserted by Conjecture 3.2 is shown by a vertical dashed line
in each curve. One interesting observation from Figure 3 is
that H(n;µ,Θ) could possibly be connected with α12 > 0
even when α = 0. In particular, the resultant graph becomes
a bipartite graph; namely, class-1 nodes are adjacent only to
class-2 nodes and class-2 nodes are adjacent only to class-1
nodes. Such a behavior confirms the importance of α12 over
α11 and α22. This is also captured in Figure 4; wherein, the
probability of connectivity is indeed 0 when α12 = 0.
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Fig. 3. Empirical probability that H(n;µ,Θ) is connected as a function
of α for K1 = 20, K1 = 25, K1 = 30, and K1 = 35, with n = 500
and P = 104 ; in each case, α12 = 0.2 . The empirical probability value
is obtained by averaging over 400 experiments. Vertical dashed lines stand
for the critical threshold of connectivity asserted by Conjecture 3.2.
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Fig. 4. Empirical probability that H(n;µ,Θ) is connected as a function
of α12 for K1 = 20, K1 = 25, K1 = 30, and K1 = 35, with n = 500
and P = 104; in each case, α11 = α22 = 0.2 . The empirical probability
value is obtained by averaging over 400 experiments. Vertical dashed lines
stand for the critical threshold of connectivity asserted by Conjecture 3.2.
5. PROOF OF THEOREM 3.1
A. Preliminaries
Several technical results are collected here for conve-
nience. The first result follows easily from the scaling con-
dition (7).
Proposition 5.1 ([6, Proposition 4.1]). For any scaling
K1,K2, . . . ,Kr, P : N0 → N
r+1
0 , we have
λ1(n) ≤ λ2(n) ≤ . . . ≤ λr(n) (11)
for each n = 2, 3, . . ..
Proposition 5.2 ([6, Proposition 4.4]). For any set of positive
integers K1, . . . ,Kr, P and any scalar a ≥ 1, we have(
P−⌈aKi⌉
Kj
)
(
P
Kj
) ≤
((
P−Ki
Kj
)
(
P
Kj
)
)a
, i, j = 1, . . . , r (12)
Other useful bound that will be used throughout is
(1 ± x) ≤ e±x, x ∈ (0, 1) (13)
Finally, we find it useful to write
log(1− x) = −x−Ψ(x) (14)
where Ψ(x) =
∫ x
0
t
1−t dt. From L’Hoˆpital’s Rule, we have
lim
x→0
Ψ(x)
x2
=
−x− log(1 − x)
x2
=
1
2
. (15)
B. Establishing the one-law
The proof of Theorem 3.1 relies on the method of first and
second moments applied to the number of isolated nodes
in H(n;µ,Θn). Let In(µ,Θn) denote the total number of
isolated nodes in H(n;µ,Θn), namely,
In(µ,Θn) =
n∑
ℓ=1
1[vℓ is isolated in H(n;µ,Θn)] (16)
The method of first moment [23, Eqn. (3.10), p. 55] gives
1− E[In(µ,Θn)] ≤ P[In(µ,Θn) = 0]
It is clear that in order to establish the one-law, namely
that limn→∞ P [In(µ,Θn) = 0] = 1, we need to show that
lim
n→∞
E[In(µ,Θn)] = 0.
Recalling (16), we have
E [In(µ,Θn)]
= n
r∑
i=1
µiP [v1 is isolated in H(n;µ,Θn) | t1 = i]
= n
r∑
i=1
µiP
[
∩nj=2[vj ≁ v1] | v1 is class i
]
= n
r∑
i=1
µi (P [v2 ≁ v1 | v1 is class i])n−1 (17)
where (17) follows by the independence of the rvs {vj ≁
v1}nj=1 given Σ1. By conditioning on the class of v2, we
find
P[v2 ≁ v1 | t1 = i] =
r∑
j=1
µjP[v2 ≁ v1 | t1 = i, t2 = j]
=
r∑
j=1
µj(1 − αijpij) = 1− Λi(n).
(18)
Using (18) in (17), and recalling (2), (13) we obtain
E[In(µ,Θn)] = n
r∑
i=1
µi (1− Λi(n))
n−1
≤ n (1− Λm(n))
n−1
= n
(
1− cn
logn
n
)n−1
≤ elogn(1−cn
n−1
n )
Taking the limit as n goes to infinity, we immediately get
lim
n→∞
E[In(µ,Θn)] = 0.
since limn→∞(1 − cn n−1n ) = 1 − c < 0 under the enforced
assumptions (with c > 1) and the one-law is established.
C. Establishing the zero-law
Our approach in establishing the zero-law relies on the
method of second moment applied to a variable that counts
the number of nodes that are class-m and isolated. Clearly if
we can show that whp there exists at least one class-m node
that is isolated under the enforced assumptions (with c < 1)
then the zero-law would immediately follow.
Let Yn(µ,Θn) denote the number of nodes that are class-
m and isolated in H(n;µ,Θn), and let
xn,i(µ,Θn) = 1[ti = m ∩ vi is isolated in H(n;µ,Θn)],
then we have Yn(µ,Θn) =
∑n
i=1 xn,i(µ,Θn). By applying
the method of second moments [23, Remark 3.1, p. 55] on
Yn(µ,Θn), we get
P[Yn(µ,Θn) = 0] ≤ 1−
E[Yn(µ,Θn)]
2
E[Yn(µ,Θn)2]
(19)
where
E[Yn(µ,Θn)] = nE[xn,1(µ,Θn)] (20)
and
E[Yn(µ,Θn)
2] =nE[xn,1(µ,Θn)]
+ n(n− 1)E[xn,1(µ,Θn)xn,2(µ,Θn)]
(21)
by exchangeability and the binary nature of the rvs
{xn,i(µ,Θn)}ni=1. Using (20) and (21), we get
E[Yn(µ,Θn)
2]
E[Yn(µ,Θn)]2
=
1
nE[xn,1(µ,Θn)]
+
n− 1
n
E[xn,1(µ,Θn)xn,2(µ,Θn)]
E[xn,1(µ,Θn)]2
In order to establish the zero-law, we need to show that
lim
n→∞
nE[xn,1(µ,Θn)] =∞, (22)
and
lim sup
n→∞
(
E[xn,1(µ,Θn)xn,2(µ,Θn)]
E[xn,1(µ,Θn)]2
)
≤ 1. (23)
We establish (22) and (23) in the following propositions.
Proposition 5.3. Consider a scaling K1, . . . ,Kr, P : N0 →
N
r+1
0 and a scaling α = {αij} := N0 → (0, 1)r×r such that
(8) holds with limn→∞ cn = c > 0. Then, we have
lim
n→∞
nE[xn,1(µ,Θn)] =∞, if c < 1
Proof: We have
nE [xn,1(µ,Θn)]
= nE [1[t1 = m ∩ v1 is isolated in H(n;µ,Θn)]]
= nµmP
[
∩nj=2[vj ≁ v1] | t1 = m
]
= nµmP [v2 ≁ v1 | t1 = m]
n−1
= nµm

 r∑
j=1
µj(1 − αmjpmj)


n−1
= nµm (1− Λm(n))
n−1 = µme
βn (24)
where
βn = logn+ (n− 1) log(1− Λm(n)).
Recalling (14), we get
βn = logn− (n− 1) (Λm(n) + Ψ(Λm(n)))
= logn
(
1− cn
n− 1
n
)
− (n− 1)
(
cn
logn
n
)2 Ψ(cn log nn )(
cn
log n
n
)2 (25)
Recalling (15), we have
lim
n→∞
Ψ
(
cn
logn
n
)
(
cn
log n
n
)2 = 12 (26)
since cn lognn = o(1). Thus, βn = logn
(
1− cn
n−1
n
)
− o(1).
Using (24), (25), (26), and letting n go to infinity, we get
lim
n→∞
nE[xn,1(µ,Θn)] =∞
whenever limn→∞ cn = c < 1.
Proposition 5.4. Consider a scaling K1, . . . ,Kr, P : N0 →
N
r+1
0 and a scaling α = {αij} := N0 → (0, 1)r×r such that
(8) holds with limn→∞ cn = c > 0. Then, we have (23) if
c < 1.
We omit the proof of Proposition 5.4 from this conference
version. All details can be found in [24]. Collectively, Propo-
sition 5.3 and Proposition 5.4 establish (22) and (23) which
in turn establish the zero-law.
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